Estate taxation with warm-glow altruism by Carlos Garriga & Fernando Sánchez-Losada
      Research Division 
          Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 




























FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS 
Research Division 
P.O. Box 442  
St. Louis, MO 63166 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
The views expressed are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, or the Board of Governors. 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate 
discussion and critical comment. References in publications to Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working 
Papers (other than an acknowledgment that the writer has had access to unpublished material) should be 
cleared with the author or authors. Estate Taxation with Warm-Glow Altruism￿
Carlos Garrigay
Research Division
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Fernando SÆnchez-Losada
Departament de Teoria Econ￿mica
Universitat de Barcelona
This version: November 2008
First version: January 2001
Abstract
This article examines the properties of the optimal ￿scal policy in an economy with warm-
glow altruism (utility interdependence) and heterogeneous individuals. We propose a new e¢ -
ciency concept, D-e¢ ciency, that considers an implicit constraint in the act of giving: donors
cannot bequeath to donees more than their existing resources. Considering this constraint, we
show that the market equilibrium is not socially e¢ cient. The e¢ cient level of bequest transfers
can be implemented by the market with estate and labor-income subsidies and a capital-income
tax. In the absence of lump-sum taxation, the government faces a trade-o⁄ between minimiz-
ing distortions and eliminating external e⁄ects. The implied tax policy di⁄ers from Pigovian
taxation since the government￿ s ability to correct the external e⁄ects is limited. Finally, we
show that the e¢ ciency-equity trade-o⁄ does not a⁄ect the qualitative features of the optimal
distortionary ￿scal policy.
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11. Introduction
The existence and consequences of estate taxes have been debated recently in public domains. The
supporters of estate taxation note that only a very small percentage of citizens pays this tax, mainly
those with large estates. The rationale for a highly progressive tax is to reduce the concentration
of wealth and provide equal opportunity for the newborn generations. The opponents claim that
estate taxes slow economic growth, destroy small business, and generate large transaction costs
and ine¢ ciencies that households must incur to avoid estate taxation. The debate has resulted in
a wide variety of proposals, ranging from the abolition of any source of estate or gift taxation and
raising revenues through other taxes to high increases in the marginal rate of estate taxation. Just as
Cremer and Pestieau (2006) suggest, the optimal estate tax should be judged, just like any other tax,
against two criteria: e¢ ciency and equity. E¢ ciency implies minimization of distortionary e⁄ects
of taxation, whereas equity relies on some normative social preference for inter or intragenerational
distribution.
The importance of altruism is evident at he aggregate level. The empirical studies of Kotliko⁄
and Summers (1981, 1986), McGarry and Schoeni (1995), and Davies and Shorrocks (2000) reveal
that between 40 to 80 percent of wealth is transferred across generations. In particular, Gale and
Scholz (1994) use direct measures of intergenerational links to attribute 63 percent of the current
U.S. capital stock to bequests. Nonetheless, one of the most serious di¢ culties in studying this
problem is that the empirical evidence is not conclusive on why individuals are altruistic. This fact
can be summarized by the di⁄erent class of models used to rationalize this behavior: dynastic, warm-
glow or joy-of-giving, accidental, or strategic (see Laitner, 1997; for a detailed survey). Clearly, the
implications of the estate taxation should depend on the bequest motive.
In this article, we consider a warm-glow altruism motive where in parents derive utility directly
from giving bequests to their o⁄spring, as in Yaari (1965). A large-scale version of this model,
where generations live more than two periods,1 is consistent with the observed wealth and income
distribution in developed countries.2 The introduction of this form of altruism has important
1In the analysis we use a two-period economy for two reasons. The ￿rst reason is to provide comparable results
with previous work in the literature. Second, models with more than two periods impose some constraints in the set
of ￿scal instruments if age-speci￿c taxes are not allowed (see Escolano, 1992; Garriga, 2000; and Erosa and Gervais,
2002). These restrictions usually imply capital-income taxes di⁄erent from zero. Therefore, given that we want to
study the pure e⁄ects of altruism, the driving forces of the main results should not depend on exogenous restrictions
on the set of instruments that the government can use.
2Quadrini and R￿os-Rull (1997) ￿nd that the standard models with dynastic altruism cannot account for the
observed wealth and income distribution. Nevertheless, de Nardi (2004) shows that warm-glow linkages are important
to explain the emergence of large estates that characterize the upper tail of the wealth distribution observed in the
2implications for the optimal ￿scal policy in an otherwise standard life cycle model. In the presence
of warm-glow altruism donors usually consider only the direct e⁄ect on their utility but they do
not consider the indirect e⁄ect on the donee(s). This utility interdependence generates an external
e⁄ect that confers a new role to estate and gift taxation.3
The article has two important contributions. The ￿rst one is to analyze the concept of Pareto
e¢ ciency in the presence of warm-glow altruism. Counting warm glow in the social welfare function
raises a number of issues. Because bequests are not part of the resource constraint of the economy,
utilitarian economists have claimed that they should be in￿nite, and, thus, individuals derive a non-
bounded utility from giving at no real resource cost. To avoid this problem, a common strategy
has been to eliminate any warm glow (or utility interdependence) in the notion of social optima.4
Even though e¢ cient allocations are well de￿ned in this reduced context, the social planner ignores
individual preferences and does not consider the indirect e⁄ect of the donor transfer on the donee.
These two approaches ignore an implicit constraint in the act of giving: donors cannot bequeath to
the donee more than their existing available resources. Therefore, e¢ ciency should consider not only
the presence of external e⁄ects and utilitarian social preferences, but also this constraint inherent to
the act of giving. Moreover, the social planner should also have some ability to redistribute resources
and attain the socially e¢ cient level of altruism.We propose a new e¢ ciency concept, D-e¢ ciency,
where D refers to distributional. Under the notion of D-e¢ ciency, the income distribution is
determined by the social planner, and the bounds on the act of giving are endogenous. Considering
this constraint, we show that in general the market equilibrium is not socially e¢ cient. The e¢ cient
level of bequests transfers can be implemented by the market with estate and labor-income subsidies
and a capital-income tax.
In the absence of lump-sum taxation, estate subsidies must use distortionary taxation to be
funded. We focus the analysis of distortionary taxation along two important dimensions. The
￿rst dimension is the trade-o⁄ between e¢ ciency and eliminating the external e⁄ects. We show
how the optimal ￿scal policy equates these distortions at the margin and how the implied estate
tax di⁄ers from the ￿rst-best policy. The second dimension, and our second contribution, is the
e¢ ciency-equity trade-o⁄ in the presence of heterogeneity (associated with di⁄erent endowments
data for United States and Sweden, whereas a model with accidental bequests does not generate the observed wealth
concentration.
3When bequests are accidental, a con￿scatory estate tax is optimal. However, in the presence of dynastic altruism
Cremer and Pestieau (2006) show that wealth transfers should not be taxed in the long run.
4Another alternative has been to use the standard in￿nite horizon model ￿ la Barro-Becker and avoid double-
counting by considering only the welfare of the ￿rst generation.
3of e¢ ciency units of labor or individual skills). We show that the qualitative features of the model
without heterogeneity can be extended to the heterogeneity case regardless of the government￿ s
ability to condition taxes by the skill type.
Finally, we present a numerical simulation of the optimal ￿scal policy under di⁄erent tax con-
straints. The objective is to illustrate the theory and its implications, not to develop a quantitative
analysis. In the presence of homogenous consumers, we ￿nd that the model can generate relatively
high capital-income taxes and estate and labor-income subsidies to implement the e¢ cient level of
bequests. In the second-best equilibrium, the government must balance the distortionary e⁄ects of
the di⁄erent tax instruments with the external e⁄ect of the bequests. This con￿ ict is resolved with
a higher positive capital-income tax and a lower estate subsidy. However, the labor-income tax
becomes positive. In the presence of heterogeneity, we ￿nd that it is optimal for the government
to implement a tax code with a large degree of progressivity across individual skills. However, the
qualitative ￿ndings for the optimal tax rates are similar: a high estate subsidy, high capital-income
tax, and a positive labor-income tax. When taxes cannot be conditioned by individual skills, the
government faces a trade-o⁄ between e¢ ciency (minimizing distortions) and equity (redistributing
resources) because all households must pay the same tax rates. This solution could be interpret as
a pooling equilibrium where individual skills and e⁄ort are not observable. The lack of progressiv-
ity reduces government￿ s e⁄ectiveness in minimizing distortions, but the qualitative results are the
same. Clearly, heterogeneity can imply important quantitative di⁄erences in terms of the optimal
tax rates, but it does not a⁄ect the nature of the market ine¢ ciencies associated with warm-glow
altruism.
Several theoretical articles have studied the e⁄ects of the ￿scal policy in economies with warm-
glow altruistic agents. Michel and Pestieau (2004) show that, in the absence of cross elasticities,
the capital-income tax might be higher than the estate tax if its own compensated elasticity was
lower than that of bequests. When bequests are not part of the social utility function, clearly they
must be taxed at a relatively high rate. The purpose of our article is to provide new insights on
the optimal tax mix in the presence of warm-glow altruism by dealing directly with the presence
of external e⁄ects. Hence, the ine¢ ciency sources are highlighted. Finally, Blumkin and Sadka
(2003) examine the optimal estate tax in an economy with altruistic and accidental bequests but
with no annuity markets and without capital. They ￿nd that the estate tax is highly sensitive
to the relative importance of the two bequest motives. In particular, the estate tax corrects the
incompleteness of the insurance market. We believe our results complement their ￿ndings and
4highlight di⁄erent aspects of estate taxation. Our model di⁄ers from theirs in several dimensions:
we assume warm-glow altruism in the social utility function, that capital accumulates, markets are
complete, and households have a certain life span.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the market economy. Section 3 shows
the e¢ cient allocation. Section 4 analyzes the optimal policy with distortionary taxation, whereas
section 5 illustrates the obtained results with a numerical example. Finally, section 6 summarizes
and concludes our ￿ndings.
2. Market Economy with Production
Consider an overlapping generations economy with production and constant population. Aggregate
output is produced with a constant returns to scale technology F (Kt;Nt); where Kt and Nt are
capital and labor, respectively. The production function F is concave, C2; and satis￿es the Inada
conditions. Capital depreciates at a constant rate, ￿ 2 [0;1]. With competitive factor markets,
each input receives its marginal product, so that rt = FKt ￿￿ and wt = FNt; where rt is the return
of capital net of depreciation and wt is the wage. The economy resource constraint is
Ct + Kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Kt + Gt = F(Kt;Nt); 8t; (1)
where Ct denotes aggregate consumption at period t; Gt is a non productive government expendi-
ture, and Kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Kt is the gross investment.
There are n types of households. Each type is endowed with di⁄erent publicly observable levels
of e¢ ciency units of labor given by ￿i 2 f￿1;:::;￿ng; where ￿1 < ￿2 < ::: < ￿n: Let ￿i denote the
measure of agents of type ￿i: Individuals live for two periods: young and old. Individuals born in




t is the gross labor income. They also receive a physical bequest,
bi
t; from their parents. Then, they choose consumption, ci
1t; and asset holdings, ai
t+1. When
individuals become old, they allocate the return from savings between consumption, ci
2t+1; and
bequests to their o⁄spring, bi
t+1. The warm-glow altruism implies that individuals derive utility
from the bequest given to their o⁄spring, but they do not derive it directly from their children
happiness. We assume that parents value the after-tax bequest, otherwise estate taxation would
be non distortionary.5 In this environment, an individual type ￿i of the generation born in period





































t are estate, capital, and labor-income proportional taxes at time t for the individual type ￿i;
respectively. We purposely choose to de￿ne an equilibrium where tax rates can vary by skill type.
In this set up the government can always choose to tax all individuals at the same rate; that is,
￿li
t = ￿l
t for all i: Both period utility functions U and V are strictly concave, C2; and satisfy the
usual Inada conditions. At t = 0, there exists an initial generation that owns the initial stock of
debt and capital and solves a similar problem.

































t denote the capital and debt own by the individual type ￿i at period t; respectively,
and Ri
t is the return on government bonds paid to the individual type ￿i.6 The aggregates are






















t. The amount of
government debt is bounded by a large positive constant to ensure that the government budget
constraint is satis￿ed in present value. Finally, in the capital markets the aggregate level of asset




t+1 = Kt+1 + Dt+1; 8t: (6)
De￿nition 1 (Market Equilibrium): Given a ￿scal policy ￿; and a sequence of government ex-
penditure fGtg1









6Because the government may condition the taxes to the individual type ￿
i; then it may condition the net return
on government debt to the type, too.
6production plans fKt;Ntg1
t=0; and prices p = ffRi
tgn
i=1;rt;wtg1
t=0; such that i) x solves the house-
holds problem, ii) the production plans solve the ￿rms￿problem, iii) markets clear, and iv) the
government budget constraint holds.













= (1 ￿ ￿li





= 1 + ￿bi
t+1; 8i;t; (9)
together with an arbitrage condition between the net return on government bonds and capital, i.e.,
Ri
t+1 = 1 + rt+1(1 ￿ ￿ki
t+1). Eq. (7) and Eq. (8) are the standard intertemporal and intratemporal
￿rst-order conditions.7 Eq.(9) determines the optimal bequest and shows that donors consider only
the direct e⁄ect of the bequest in their utility function but do not consider the indirect e⁄ect on
the donee.
3. First-Best Policy





In general, the market solution might fail to be e¢ cient because the donor considers only the
direct e⁄ect of the bequest in the utility function, but fails to consider the indirect e⁄ect on the
donee. The main problem in calculating the degree of market failure in the presence of warm-glow
altruism is that individuals assign utility to the bequest, which is not properly a commodity and,
consequently, it does not a⁄ect the aggregate resource constraint.8 When there exists a choice
variable that does not appear in the resource constraint, we might need additional information to
7As in Michel and Pestieau (2004), we exclude non-interior solutions for the leisure decision. The decision to work
or not has been studied in more detail by Michel and Pestieau (1999).
8This is not an important challenge for the de￿nition of second-best allocations because they explicitly deal with
the individual budget constraint. However, it can create some important problems in de￿ning ￿rst-best or Pareto
e¢ cient allocations.
7determine its value. In the presence of altruism, the act of giving (choice variable) is bounded by the
amount of individuals￿resources determined by their budget constraint. Consequently, individuals￿
cannot promise and transfer more resources to another individual than the available income or
wealth. The social planner should respect this constraint inherent to the act of giving, but it
should also have some ability to redistribute resources (i.e., make the donor relatively wealthier)
and attain the socially e¢ cient level of altruism. Hence, the bounds on the act of giving and the
implied income distribution are determined by the social planner.
One way to think about the determination of each individual share on income is to view the
social planner as the agent that assigns resources to the production process. In our particular
case, young individuals provide labor units to produce, whereas old individuals provide capital
units. Therefore, the production process has some implications in the income and consumption
distributions because individuals who provide labor units are entitled to receive labor earnings,
and individuals who provide capital are entitled to receive capital earnings. Consequently, the
determinants of the socially e¢ cient income distribution are the same as in the market economy.
Thus, a social planner whose social preferences represent individual preferences should consider not
only the external e⁄ects, but also the e⁄ect the income distribution.
Usually, the concept of Pareto e¢ ciency is silent about the income distribution. We propose a
new e¢ ciency concept, D-e¢ ciency, where D refers to distributional,9 that considers both the pres-
ence of external e⁄ects and the income distribution. Under the notion of D-e¢ ciency, the income
distribution is determined by the social planner (since it can use lump-sum taxes), and the bounds
on the act of giving are endogenous. A social planner problem consists of maximizing a social
welfare function subject to the sequential individual constraints, the ￿rms￿optimal conditions, the
market clearing conditions, and the government budget constraint. Adding these constraints gives
the resource constraint of the economy. When markets are competitive and there are no market
failures in the economy, it is easy to prove that the solution to the original problem coincides with
the solution of the maximization of the social welfare function subject to the resource constraint.
However, this is not necessarily the case if some type of market failure exists. Because this is also
our case, we use the original problem.
9This concept is similar to the e¢ ciency concept proposed by DÆvila et al. (2007), where the income distribution
becomes a state variable of the social planner￿ s problem.




































t = Gt; 8t; (16)
where li
t 2 (0;1) for all i:
The initial distribution of entitlements at t = 0 is exogenously given fai
0gn
i=1; Ti
t is a lump-
sum tax paid by the young individuals, the relative weight that the government assigns present









simplicity, we assume ￿i = ￿ = 1: Separating the income source for each individual constrains
the act of giving. Note that ai
t+1 should be interpreted as entitlements for the utilization of the
capital stock in the next period. Also note that adding Eq. (12) and Eq. (13) for all i and using
Eqs. (14)-(16), we have the resource constraint. Therefore, intergenerational transfers are possible.
The social planner understands that next-period aggregate capital stock requires a consumption
sacri￿ce by the young generations. More important, the planner uses the distribution of entitlements
to determine next-period e¢ cient allocation between consumption and bequests that is likely to
di⁄er from that implied by the market. The e¢ cient distribution of entitlements (savings) can be
decentralized as a market solution with the appropriate tax/subsidy policy.
In this problem, the social planner not only takes into account the external e⁄ects, but it also
takes into account the impact of the labor supply and the entitlements on its respective marginal
productivities. Individuals in the market are price takers, and they will not take this e⁄ect into





















































t = Gt; 8t: (18)























































; 8i 6= j; 8t: (22)












The social planner equates the marginal cost from giving an additional unit of consumption from
the donor￿ s perspective with the social marginal bene￿t of giving a bequest. That includes the
direct e⁄ect on the donor￿ s utility function and the indirect e⁄ect on the donee budget set. A
socially e¢ cient allocation reduces the marginal utility of giving a bequest, Vbi
t; by considering its




1t: In general, the market outcome is socially ine¢ cient unless
we consider e¢ cient solutions wherein the social planner sets ￿ = 0; and only worries about the
current old generation.
The implied tax policy can be obtained by combining the ￿rst-order conditions of the social
planner problem with the market conditions.




























































The implied estate tax is always negative, even in steady state, and it depends on the size of
the bequest, the endogenous income distribution, and the ratio of discount rates (individual and
planning weights). The objective of the estate subsidy is to reduce the relative price of the bequest
and induce a higher level of transfers in the market. The capital and labor-income taxes are set
to induce the e¢ cient level of savings and labor supply. Individual lump-sum taxes are calculated
given the individual collected taxes, the social planner allocation, and Eq. (18) and Eq. (22).10
When individuals are homogeneous, n = 1. Then, using the property of homogeneity of degree
zero of the derivatives of the production function and suppressing the individual type superscript,





(FKt￿￿) > 0; whereas the








< 0. It is important to mention that if the social
planner does not consider the impact of capital and labor supply decisions on each individual com-
pensations, then the implied tax rates are zero. Also, if there was no external e⁄ect (i.e., Vbt = 0),
then we would recover the typical ￿rst-best result where ￿k
t = ￿l
t = 0 for all t; and we could have
added all the constraints into the resource constraint.
Corollary 1: If individuals are homogeneous, then the e¢ cient ￿scal policy from t > 0 requires
positive capital-income taxes and negative estate and labor-income taxes.
If the government does not have access to lump-sum taxation, it needs to consider and prioritize
the distortions when choosing the optimal ￿scal policy.
10Note that Eq. (22) crucially depends on the weights assigned to each individual type by the social planner.
114. The Government Problem and Second-Best Policy
In this, section we state and solve the government problem. We consider a government that chooses
a ￿scal policy, ￿; to maximize the welfare of all present and future generations.11 To solve the gov-
ernment problem we use the primal approach of optimal taxation proposed by Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1980).12 The characterization of this problem includes a larger set of constraints than the social
planner problem de￿ned in the previous section. Therefore, the solution of the second-best policy
cannot yield utility higher than the ￿rst-best allocation.
De￿nition 3 (Government Problem): Given an initial distribution of tax rates, f￿ki
0 gn
i=1; and
a distribution of wealth, fai
0gn






































1 + (1 ￿ ￿ki


























Note that in this case we can add all the restrictions in the resource constraint because the imple-
mentability constraint, Eq. (28), contains the e⁄ects of individual decisions and income distribution
by the government. In particular, the external e⁄ects are taken into account in the right-hand side
of the implementability constraint for newborn cohorts. Using the primal approach, it is straight
11Throughout the article we assume that the government can commit to the optimal policy, and thus time-
consistency issues are ignored.
12This approach is based on characterizing the set of allocations that the government can implement for a given ￿scal
policy ￿: The set of implementable allocations is described by a sequence of resource and implementability constraints.
The implementability constraints are the households￿present value budget constraints, after substituting in the ￿rst-
order conditions of the consumers￿and the ￿rms￿problems. These constraints capture the direct e⁄ect of ￿scal
policy on agents￿decisions and an indirect e⁄ect on prices. Thus, the government problem amounts to maximizing a
social welfare function over the set of implementable allocations. From the optimal allocations we can decentralize
the economy, ￿nding the prices and the optimal ￿scal policy. The implementability constraint can be easily derived
combining the ￿rst-order conditions of the consumer problem with the intertemporal budget constraint (see Chari
and Kehoe, 1999, for a detailed derivation).
12forward to shoe that the allocations in a market equilibrium satisfy the set of implementable al-







is implementable, then we can construct a ￿scal policy, ￿; and market prices, p; such that the
allocation together with the prices, p; and the tax policy, ￿; constitute an equilibrium as de￿ned in
the second section.13
In the absence of lump-sum taxation, the government faces a trade-o⁄ between distortions and
external e⁄ects. We assume that n = 1 and thus we suppress the individual type superscript.
We will show that all ￿ndings can be generalized provided the government can observe either
the labor supply and/or the skill type and therefore the optimal tax rates can be conditioned on
observables ￿(￿i): When taxes cannot be conditioned on skills, the government faces a trade-o⁄
between e¢ ciency and redistribution. However, in the next section we use a numerical example to
show that the qualitative properties of a pooling equilibrium in which all individual types pay the
same tax rates are similar.
To derive a solution to the previous problem, we rede￿ne the government objective function
by introducing the implementability constraint of each generation. For a newborn generation the
government period utility becomes
W(et;￿t) = U(c1t;lt) + ￿V (c2t+1;bt+1) + ￿t
￿








where et = (c1t;lt;c2t+1;bt+1); and ￿t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the implementabil-
ity constraint of a generation born at period t: The additional term measures the e⁄ect of distor-







= 1 ￿ ￿ + FKt+1; (33)
13The presence of debt allows the government to redistribute resources across generations and attain the modi￿ed







, is inherited by the government. For economies
in which agents live a ￿nite number of periods, this assumption is not very important because taxes at t = 0 cannot
be used to mimic lump sum and obtain a ￿rst-best assignment.
14It is important to note that, given the nature of this problem, the ￿rst-order conditions together with the
transversality condition might not be su¢ cient to characterize a solution; that depends on the properties of the
implementability constraint, which might fail to be convex. A detailed discussion of this problem can be found in









where the term Wx denotes the derivative of the objective function with respect to x:15 The La-
grange multiplier in Eq.(35) captures the external e⁄ect on the budget constraint of the younger
generations. Clearly, the ￿rst-order conditions of the government problem and the social planner












￿tZ1t + ￿t￿1Z2t; (36)
where the terms Zit capture the distortionary e⁄ects of estate taxation for the individual of age
i at time t:16 The incentives to reduce the external e⁄ect need to be balanced with the negative
impact of raising additional distortions in both existing generations. The negative impact is cap-
tured by the Lagrange multiplier of the implementability constraint, ￿t; for all t; and the impact
on the optimal decisions of each cohort Zit for i = 1;2: In the presence of lump-sum taxation, the
Lagrange multiplier of the implementability constraint is zero; i.e., ￿t = 0 for all t: However, in
the absence of lump-sum taxation the implementability constraint is binding. To characterize the
optimal ￿scal policy we combine the optimal conditions of the government￿ s problem together with
the consumer￿ s and the ￿rms￿optimal conditions.
Proposition 2: The optimal ￿scal policy from t > 0 under ￿ requires
￿l







Wc1t = Uc1t + ￿t [Uc1t + (c1t ￿ bt)Uc1tc1t + ltUltc1t];
Wlt = Ult + ￿t [Ult + ltUltlt + (c1t ￿ bt)Uc1tlt];
Wc2t = Vc2t + ￿t￿1[Vc2t + c2tVc2tc2t + btVbtc2t];
Wbt = Vbt + ￿t￿1[Vbt + btVbtbt + c2tVc2tbt]:
The additional terms on the marginal utilities capture the e¢ cient distortion, in terms of allocations, chosen by the
government. At t = 0; these expressions include additional terms that account for the initial income distribution.
16Formally,
Z1t = (c1t ￿ bt)Uc1tc1t + ltUltc1t;
























The trade-o⁄ between e¢ ciency and external e⁄ects is captured by the term Ht 6= 0; and the
optimal estate tax di⁄ers from the e¢ cient one obtained in the previous section. In general, the
presence of warm-glow altruism implies estate and capital-income taxes di⁄erent from zero. We
state without proof the next corollary, which shows a su¢ cient condition for uniform taxation in
this economy.
Corollary 2: If the utility function satis￿es the following condition:






then the optimal policy implies setting ￿k
t = 0 from t > 1:
In general, standard preferences used in the macroeconomics and public ￿nance literature do
not satisfy this condition. Consequently, the presence of this form of altruism can lead to new roles
for capital-income and estate taxation. These results di⁄er from the standard model with dynastic
altruism. In particular, Cremer and Pestieau (2006) show that in the dynastic altruism model the
government would set capital-income and estate taxation to zero in the long run.
Because estate subsidies might be di¢ cult to implement and could require high administra-
tive costs of monitoring the actual transfer, we consider the case where the government faces
a non-negativity constraint on estate taxation. Formally, this amounts to imposing an addi-
tional constraint in the government problem. In particular, second-best allocations need to sat-
isfy ￿b




t=0, and the intergenerational distribution becomes a constraint that the gov-
ernment can only indirectly in￿ uence through capital-income taxation. The associated optimal







￿ = 1 ￿ ￿ + FKt+1; (42)
15where Qt+1 is an additional term that captures the impact of the tax restrictions on the marginal
utility of consumers.17 The next proposition characterizes the optimal ￿scal policy in the absence
of estate taxes.
Proposition 3: The optimal ￿scal policy from t > 0 under b ￿R requires
￿l

















In the presence of estate taxes the government has some degree of ￿ exibility to separate the
external e⁄ects and minimize distortions on the consumer decisions. When the estate taxes are not
available, the implied optimal capital-income tax must consider this e⁄ect. The e⁄ect is captured
by the Qt+1 term in the ￿rst-order conditions of the government￿ s problem and, as a result, the
optimal ￿scal policy di⁄ers from the previous case where estate taxes were available.
We can extend these results to the case of n > 1 as long as the government can condition
taxes on individual skills. In this case, the government can implement the second-best allocations
focusing on e¢ ciency and ignoring any equity considerations. Nevertheless, when taxes cannot be
conditioned on skills, the government faces a trade-o⁄ between e¢ ciency and equity. This trade-o⁄
can imply tax rates that di⁄er from the obtained in propositions 2 and 3.18 We explore all these
issues in the next section.
5. A Numerical Example
In general, it is di¢ cult to characterize the properties of the optimal ￿scal policy beyond the






18This solution could be interpreted as a pooling equilibrium in which where individual skills and e⁄ort are not
observable. In a separating equilibrium the government would o⁄er a menu of contracts that satis￿es the incentive
compatibility constraint of each type. We do not explore this possibility in this paper because we want to avoid the
e⁄ect of informational frictions and focus only on e¢ ciency considerations.
16elasticities. In the absence of a closed-form solution, we present a numerical simulation of the
optimal tax policy under di⁄erent tax constraints. The objective is to illustrate a case example
and its implications, not to develop a quantitative analysis on normative estate taxation. We solve
numerically a steady-state equilibrium of the government problem for a given choice of functional
forms and parameters and compare the outcomes with the ￿rst-best allocations.19 We also consider
an extension that includes heterogeneous consumers.
We consider a standard constant returns to scale production function, F(Kt;Nt) = K￿
t N1￿￿
t ;
and preferences of the form
[c
!1










where when ￿ = 1 the utility function becomes logarithmic. The parameter values used in the
simulation are summarized in Table 1.20
Table 1: Parameter values (yearly)
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ !1 !2 ￿ G=Y
0.4 0.06 0.968 0.95 3.5 0.3 0.85 1 0.20
Table 2 displays the numerical solutions of the optimal tax rates for di⁄erent sets of instruments.
Table 2: Optimal ￿scal policy (n = 1)
First-Best Second-Best Second-Best (￿b ￿ 0)
Capital-income tax (%) 37:9 54:8 33:3
Estate tax (%) ￿73:3 ￿50:0 0:0
Labor-income tax (%) ￿46:4 28:1 28:4
Consumption equivalent variation (%) - 1:17 1:20
The ￿rst column in Table 2 describes the optimum ￿rst-best policy where the government has
access to lump-sum taxes. The second and third columns show the numerical solution when the
19We assume that the sequence of government expenditure converges in the long-run to a constant level G. In an
in￿nitely lived consumer model, the initial level of debt a⁄ects the tightness of the implementability constraint and
therefore the optimal ￿scal policy. In this economy, the steadystate is independent of the initial conditions, because
the level of debt at t = 0 only appears in the implementability constraint of the initial old, but not in the newborn
generations. Hence, we can study the optimal ￿scal policy regardless of the initial conditions.
20In the numerical simulations, the parameters ￿; ￿; and ￿ have been adjusted to consider that one period in the
model consists of 30 years.
17government has access only to distortionary linear taxes and when estate taxes are restricted to be
non-negative, respectively. The last row measures the welfare cost of distortionary taxation using
the equivalent variation in consumption.
A close inspection of Table 2 shows that the market equilibrium is suboptimal and that the
model can be consistent with large labor-income and estate subsidies and capital-income taxes.
The larger capital-income tax is consistent with preferences that violate Eq. (40) and is not related
to dynamic ine¢ ciencies because the economy satis￿es the modi￿ed golden rule; see Eqs. (33) and
(34).
When lump-sum taxes are not available the government must balance the distortionary e⁄ects
of taxation with the external e⁄ect associated with bequests. This trade-o⁄is resolved with a higher
positive capital-income tax and a lower estate subsidy. The absence of lump-sum taxation requires a
change in the sign and the magnitude of the labor-income tax; in this case, the government policy is
even more restricted. When the non-negativity constraint in estate taxation binds, the government
resolves the trade-o⁄ between the external e⁄ects and e¢ ciency with a lower capital-income tax
and almost the same labor-income tax. Because estate transfers are not subsidized, there is no
need for high capital-income taxation. This is the qualitative e⁄ect of the term Qt+1 in the Euler
equation of the government problem in Eq. (42). The trade-o⁄ between e¢ ciency and external
e⁄ects implies a utility loss for the newborn cohort.
Finally, we want to illustrate the e⁄ects of introducing intragenerational heterogeneity.21 Estate
taxation is considered an important redistributive ￿scal instrument given the documented signi￿-
cance of wealth transfers across generations and the skewness of the wealth distribution. We show
that if the government can condition the tax rates on the individual types, then the qualitative
results presented in the previous section remain unchanged. Nevertheless, the actual rates could
substantially vary by skill type. Figure 1 shows the distributions of taxes across individual types
(or productivity levels) when taxes can be conditioned on skills ￿(￿i) or not ￿NS. The subcript
NS denotes that the tax policy does not depend on individual skills. Each graph is calculated
using a di⁄erent relative weight for bequests in the utility function. The optimal tax rates can vary
substantially with a small change in parameter values, but the qualitative results discussed in the
previous sections remain unchanged. As both graphs show, the implied tax policy across individual
types is highly progressive and, as a result, households with a higher level of skills pay substantially
21We have approximated a continuous distribution of individual types ￿
i 2 [0:8;1:8] using a discrete number of
types and then interpolating on the decision rules.
18higher taxes.
Figure 1: Optimal ￿scal policy with heterogeneous types ￿(￿i) and ￿NS


































































When government cannot condition taxes on individual types, all households must pay the same
tax rates regardless of skill type. In this case, the government faces a trade-o⁄ between e¢ ciency
(minimizing distortions) and equity (redistributing resources), and the optimization problem re-
quires additional restrictions to ensure that the marginal rates of substitution across households are
equated to the same after-tax prices. In this particular example, the trade-o⁄ implies deviations
from the average tax rate for labor and capital-income taxes. However, estate taxes are roughly set
to the average value. In essence, the qualitative features of the theoretical ￿ndings from the previ-
ous section remain unaltered, but the lack of progressivity reduces the government e⁄ectiveness to
minimize distortions. Clearly, heterogeneity can imply important quantitative di⁄erences in terms
of the optimal tax rates, but it does not a⁄ect the nature of the market ine¢ ciencies associated
with warm-glow altruism.
6. Conclusions
This paper analyzes the e⁄ect of warm-glow altruism on the optimal ￿scal policy in an economy
with heterogeneous consumers. We explicitly consider an implicit constraint in the act of giving:
donors cannot bequeath to the donee(s) more than their existing available resources. We show
that the socially e¢ cient level of bequests might be di⁄erent than that implemented by the market
allocation. The external e⁄ect leads to an ine¢ cient level of altruistic transfers that can be corrected
with a estate and labor-income subsidies and a capital-income tax.
19In analyzing the second-best tax policy, the government faces a trade-o⁄ between e¢ ciency
and external e⁄ects. Hence, the optimal tax policy equates these distortions at the margin. A
quantitative example shows that the estate subsidy is lower and the capital-income tax is higher
than in the ￿rst-best policy, whereas the labor-income tax changes the sign and becomes positive.
Finally, we show that the qualitative features of the model without heterogeneity can be ex-
tended to the heterogeneous case when the government can condition taxes by the individual type.
However, the optimal policy can generate a large degree of tax progressivity across types. Never-
theless, when taxes cannot be conditioned by the individual type, the government faces a trade-o⁄
between e¢ ciency (minimizing distortions) and equity (redistributing resources) since all households
have to pay the same tax rates. The lack of progressivity reduces the government e⁄ectiveness to
minimize distortions, but the qualitative results are the same. Clearly, heterogeneity can imply
important quantitative di⁄erences in terms of the optimal tax rates, but it does not a⁄ect the
nature of the market ine¢ ciencies associated to warm-glow altruism.
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